North Dakota Law Review
Volume 40

Number 1

Article 10

1964

Mortgages - Lien Priority - Real Estate Taxes Paid by Mortgagee
Preferred over a Federal Tax Lien
Mitchell L. Olson

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr

Recommended Citation
Olson, Mitchell L. (1964) "Mortgages - Lien Priority - Real Estate Taxes Paid by Mortgagee Preferred over a
Federal Tax Lien," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 40 : No. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol40/iss1/10

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

1964]

RECENT CASES

The adequate ground rule as applied to direct review has
6
never been squarely adopted in habeas corpus proceedings.
This court deemed the doctrine applicable only as a limitation
on appellate review 11
The petitioner is barred from obtaining habeas only if
Although the court
he has waived the state remedies.
applies the classic definition of waiver as set forth in Johnson
The principal case states
v Zerbst, 8 it does not fit exactly
that such an abandonment will not result in a waiver unless
there is a deliberate by-passing of the state courts in order
to obtain federal relief.' 9
The underlying issue in this case is the willingness of the
federal courts to interfere with state criminal procedure to
insure constitutional rights. It is submitted that the balance
struck in this case is proper
LELAND HAGEN

M O R T G A G E S - LIEN PRIORITY - REAL ESTATE TAXES
PAID BY MORTGAGEE PREFERRED OVER A FEDERAL TAX LIEN Plaintiff is the assignee of a mortgage executed July 17, 1953,
On April 2, 1954, the United
and recorded July 20, 1953.
States filed a federal tax lien against the mortgaged land
On October 13, 1958, the
pursuant to federal statutes.'
assignee of the mortgage paid past due real estate taxes on
the land, as authorized by state law' and by the mortgage
See
16. See Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959) (dissent by Frankfurter)
generally, Hart, The Supreme Court-1958 Term. 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 118-25
(1959).
17. Supra note 10, at 429.
18. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
19. Supra note 10, at 439.
1.

2.

26 U.S.C. §§ 6321 and 6323(a) (1958) as follows.
Section 6321 ",If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
shall be
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount
a lien in favor of the United States.
lien
[T~he
Notice.
Without
Lien
of
"Invalidity
Section 6323 (a)
imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortfiled.
been
has
therof
until notice
gagee,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-40 (1960)
"1. Taxes upon real property are a perpetual paramount lien
thereon against all persons, except the United States and this
state.
3. A tax lien shall include the principal of the tax, and all
costs, penalties, interest, charges, and expenses which by law
shall accrue, attach, or be incurred."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-01-07 (1960)
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The real estate taxes had been levied subcovenants. 3
Upon
sequent to the recording of the federal tax lien.
foreclosure of the mortgage, the District Court approved the
distribution to the mortgagee of the mortgage amount which
included the taxes advanced by the mortgagee on October 13,
1959, plus interest thereon.
On appeal it was held, two judges dissenting, that the
The real estate taxes paid by the
judgement be affirmed.
mortgagee were entitled to the same rank and grade as the
original mortgage and therefore enjoyed the same priority
Fischer v Hoyer, 121 N.W.2d.
over the federal tax lien.
788 (N.D. 1963)
Although this question has not been definitely decided by
the United States Supreme Court, at least two Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals 4 and several state courts 5 have held that
such payments of real estate taxes by the mortgagee were
not entitled to priority over a previously recorded federal
tax lien. These decisions are the latest in a trend extending
the applicaion of the "choate lien test"6 to give priority
to federal tax liens in many related areas. 7 The basis for
applying this absolute test is that since real estate taxes
were not determinable at the time the federal tax lien was
filed, and therefore inchoate, the taxes paid by the mortgagee
could not have priority over a federal tax lien.
The court in the instant case refused to apply the "choate
lien test" and distinguished the Supreme Court cases applying
In refusing to
the test on the basis of factual differences. 8
"When the holder of a special lien is compelled to satisfy a
prior lien for his own protection, he may enforce payment of
the amount so paid by him as a part of the claim for which
his own lien exists."
the
the event mortgagor fails to pay when due any taxes
3. "In
and the amount(s) paid therefore
mortgagee may make such payment
"
shall become a part of the indebtedness secured hereby.
United States v.
4.
United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1960)
Christensen, 269 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1959).
5.
E.g., Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Peters, 361 Mich. 283, 105 N.W.2d 196
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
(1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 291 (1961)
v. United States, 9 A.D.2d 356, 195 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1959)
"(A) choate lien6.
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954)
when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount
of the lien are established." See Note, 43 MINN L. REv. 755 (1959).
"[T]he cases decided
7.
United States v. Bond, supra note 4, at 845
reveal the persistant application of the choate lien test, first in tnsolvency cases,
then sn statutory lien cases, and finally in nonstatutory contilactual lien cases."
8. See, E.g., United States v. Buffalo Say Bank, 371 U.S. 228 (1963)
United States v.
United States v. R. F Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 687 (1958)
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follow such precedent, the majority relied heavily upon the
reasoning of Judge Haynsworth's dissenting opinion in United
They felt that since a provision allowing
States v Bond.9
real estate taxes paid by a mortgagee to be added to the
principal amount of the mortgage is generally recognized in
commerce and law, the Congress must have intended to
protect that right when it gave the recorded mortgage priority
over a subsequently recorded federal tax lien. 10
It is submitted that the holding of the instant case should
be followed.
The mortgagee, upon entering into the mortgage, relies upon his ability to protect his investment against
steadily mounting interest and penalties on unpaid local taxes
by paying those taxes and adding the sum paid to his
mortgage.
This traditional right of the mortgagee must
have been recognized by Congress when it provided preference
for a prior mortgage over a subsequently recorded federal
tax lien.
MITCHELL L. OLSON
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Plaintiff, which had coined the word "POLAROID" as a trade
name for a wide variety of products, including optical devices
and photographic equipment, appealed the United States
District Court's (N.D Ill.) decision not to enjoin defendant's
use of the term "POLARAID" in connection with his business
of installing refrigeration and heating systems.
In reversing,
the Seventh District Court of Appeals held, with one dissent,
that "POLARAID" so closely resembles "POLAROID" that
it is likely to produce confusion of source, to the injury of
the corporation to which the name belongs.
Polaroid
Corporationv Polaraid,Inc., 319 F 2d. 830 (7th Cir 1963)
The use of trademarks to identify merchandise has existed
New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954)
United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S.
361 (1953)
United States v Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950)
State of Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946)
United States
v. Waddil, Holland & Flinn Co. 323 U.S. 353 (1945). (These cases involved
statutory liens, insolvency etc.)
9. 275 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1960) at 848.
10. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1958).

